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A B S T R A C T
Both optimism bias and reward-related attention bias have crucial implications for well-being and mental health.
Yet, the extent to which the two biases interact remains unclear because, to date, they have mostly been dis-
cussed in isolation. Examining interactions between the two biases can lead to new directions in neurocognitive
research by revealing their underlying cognitive and neurophysiological mechanisms. In the present article, we
suggest that optimism bias and reward-related attention bias mutually enforce each other and recruit a common
underlying neural network. Key components of this network include speciﬁc activations in the anterior and
posterior cingulate cortex with connections to the amygdala. We further postulate that biased memory processes
inﬂuence the interplay of optimism and reward-related attention bias. Studying such causal relations between
cognitive biases reveals important information not only about normal functioning and adaptive neural pathways
in maintaining mental health, but also about the development and maintenance of psychological diseases,
thereby contributing to the eﬀectiveness of treatment.
1. Introduction
Being able to adequately predict future events is crucial in everyday
life, especially when planning behavior and making decisions
(Damasio, 1994). Humans, however, tend to overestimate the like-
lihood of future positive events and underestimate the likelihood of
future negative events (Sharot et al., 2011; Weinstein, 1980). This
phenomenon, named optimism bias, describes a positivity bias in ex-
pectancies about the future and has cognitive (forming beliefs about the
future, imagining and judging future events, estimating probabilities),
motivational (maintaining favorable self-perception, denying threat),
and aﬀective origins (mood, hope; Armor and Taylor, 1998). Moreover,
it entails a behavioral component (initiating goal-directed behavior,
persistent pursuit of goals).
Optimism bias has been studied extensively in recent years because
of its implications in everyday life (e.g., goal persistence, positive aﬀect;
Armor and Taylor, 1998; Shepperd et al., 2015) and in the clinical
domain (e.g., better physical health, lowered depression rates; Garrett
et al., 2014; Hevey et al., 2014; Korn et al., 2014). Despite the theo-
retical and practical signiﬁcance of optimism bias, its underlying neural
and physiological functioning have not yet been completely identiﬁed,
and its interplay with other cognitive biases, for instance, in attention
or memory, remains to be determined.
Of note, taking other cognitive biases into account instead of
studying optimism bias in isolation can ﬁll several important gaps in the
literature. Such an approach could (a) shed further light on the cogni-
tive mechanisms underlying optimism bias, (b) allow investigation of
why optimism bias exists and how it is maintained over time, and (c)
help with the understanding of the extent to which the highly beneﬁcial
role of optimism bias is rooted in other cognitive biases. Moreover,
studying optimism bias (known to play a role in mental health; Garrett
et al., 2014; Korn et al., 2014) in relation to other cognitive biases could
(d) uncover divergences and commonalities in health and psycho-
pathology (ﬁrst by comparing interplay among reward-related biases
between the two populations; subsequently by also comparing reward-
related and negative biases) and contribute to a better understanding of
psychopathologies by (e) including potential mediating and moderating
factors in models of psychiatric diseases, thereby fostering the under-
standing of complex disease-speciﬁc chains of causality, and (f) re-
vealing how interacting cognitive biases constitute risk factors for
psychopathologies and identifying the mechanisms impeding their
treatment (Kraemer et al., 2001). Furthermore, taking into account how
diﬀerent cognitive biases that are relevant in psychological disorders
interact can (g) enhance prevention of psychopathology, (h) improve
the eﬀectiveness of state-of-the-art treatment (Aue and Okon-Singer,
2015; Everaert et al., 2012; Hirsch et al., 2006), and (i) lead to more
ﬁne-grained diagnosis of patients. In summary, studying optimism bias
in relation to other cognitive biases could not only broaden our
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knowledge about the bias itself (a–c) but could also advance theoretical
models in psychopathology (d–f) and provide help for clinical practice
(h–i).
In order to take a ﬁrst step toward ﬁlling these gaps in the literature,
the present article aims to (a) set up a framework of neurocognitive
processes that might inﬂuence or be inﬂuenced by biased optimistic
expectancies and (b) stimulate future research in the ﬁeld by outlining
speciﬁc hypotheses within the framework that are yet to be examined.
We concentrate on attentional processes with a speciﬁc focus on reward-
related processes (for the sake of brevity, we use the term “attention
bias” instead of “reward-related attention bias” in the remainder of this
article). Several ways in which optimism bias and attention bias may
interact and the extent to which they rely on shared neural mechanisms
are outlined.
We speciﬁcally focus on the interplay between optimism bias and
(reward-related) attention bias for several reasons: First, it is likely that
optimism and attention biases interact to reach a common goal: A
motivation to reach a rewarding goal has been suggested to underlie
both biases and is associated with shared neural activations (optimism
bias: Bateson, 2016; Buehler et al., 1997; Richter et al., 2012; attention
bias: Mohanty et al., 2008; Pessoa and Engelmann, 2010; Small et al.,
2005). Here, motivation represents the driving force for behavior that is
directed to a speciﬁc goal (i.e., a desired outcome), whereas reward
functions as an incentive that makes this goal desirable. Second, in the
empirical literature and theories on psychopathology (Aue and Okon-
Singer, 2015), attentional processes have been repeatedly suggested to
inﬂuence (optimistic) expectancies, which further underscores our
claim that both biases should be examined by using an integrative ap-
proach. For instance, certain brain activations have been proposed to
contribute to optimism bias by biasing attention to positive stimuli (Aue
et al., 2012; Sharot, 2011; Sharot et al., 2007). Third, the ﬁrst evidence
that processes present in optimism bias and attention bias are indeed
causally associated has been provided (Kress et al., submitted; Peters
et al., 2015). Speciﬁcally, induced state optimism has been causally
related to biased attention away from negative stimuli (Peters et al.,
2015), and induced optimistic expectancies have been shown to guide
attention toward rewarding and away from punishing stimuli (Kress
et al., submitted).
Although the main aim of the current paper is to stimulate research
on the interplay of optimism and attention bias, we also discuss the
potential role of biased memories in inﬂuencing the link between op-
timism and attention bias. Notably, because attention and memory are
highly interactive processes (Chun and Turk-Browne, 2007) and biased
memories have been associated with optimistic expectancies (Roy et al.,
2005), consideration of memory bias provides additional important
information about critical cognitive bias interplay. Therefore, we want
not only to emphasize the role of other cognitive biases that may in-
ﬂuence the link between optimism and attention bias, but also to mo-
tivate researchers to take additional biases into account in future in-
vestigations and theoretical models.
It is further important to note that our ideas build on past work from
our laboratory on expectancy biases in fear and anxiety and their link to
attention biases (Aue and Okon-Singer, 2015). Although the previous
and current articles focus on biased expectancies as related to attention
processes, the current article adds several new and important aspects:
a. Optimism bias represents a speciﬁc form of future expectancies
that stands out from other forms in terms of robustness (as shown by
selective updating of pessimistic but not optimistic expectancies when
people are confronted with disconﬁrming feedback; see Sharot et al.,
2012b, 2011).
b. Because optimism bias is suggested to play an important role in
the maintenance of depression (Garret et al., 2014; Korn et al., 2014), in
regard to implications for the clinical context, we concentrate on im-
plications for depression in the current article, in contrast to anxiety in
the previous article.
c. The current article focuses on reward-related biases in
information processing that likely derive from a motivation that is
diﬀerent from negativity biases, which are most often centered around
various forms of punishment (including frustrating non-reward), the
latter being the focus of the previous article.
d. The current article proposes possible mechanisms of neural
communication that link optimism bias and attention bias and therefore
could advance future research paths not only in cognitive research but
also in neuroscientiﬁc research.
After outlining the rationale for the current framework and its
speciﬁc focus on optimism and attention bias, we next brieﬂy introduce
the two phenomena of interest. We emphasize their relevance and
underlying neural networks, which constitute the basis on which we
have built our framework. Of note, we keep these sections short, as both
optimism bias and attention bias have been reviewed earlier (optimism
bias: Sharot, 2011; reward-related attention bias: Pool et al., 2016a). In
the present article, therefore, our primary focus is on the relation of the
two cognitive biases and the neural foundations of the proposed rela-
tion. To further reﬁne our model and inspire future research and the-
orizing in the area, we additionally propose that memory processes
inﬂuence the interplay of the two biases of main interest.
2. Optimism bias
When trying to deﬁne optimism bias, one encounters a major pro-
blem: On the one hand, diﬀerent terms (e.g., wishful thinking, un-
realistic optimism, comparative optimism, and overoptimism) have
been used to refer to the same psychological phenomenon (or at least
highly similar phenomena), while on the other hand, the same terms
have been used for slightly diﬀerent phenomena in past research.
Despite being aware that there are ﬁne-grained diﬀerences between the
diﬀerent concepts, we pool them together by using the broad term
optimism bias (as currently there is not enough literature on any of the
subconcepts of optimism bias to focus our framework on just one of
them). Representing the main character of all concepts mentioned,
optimism bias is thus deﬁned as an overestimation of positive future
events and an underestimation of negative future events (this deﬁnition
is used by all studies on optimism bias cited in this article). Moreover,
in the present article, optimism bias is exclusively deﬁned as a bias in
expectancies directed toward the future (not the present or past), a
deﬁnition that has been widely accepted in the literature (e.g., Armor
and Taylor, 1998; Campbell et al., 2007; Chambers et al., 2003;
Jeﬀerson et al., 2016; Sharot, 2011; Shepperd et al., 2013; Weinstein,
1980; for a more detailed discussion on the deﬁnition of optimism bias,
see Bortolotti and Antrobus, 2015).
Moreover, it is important to note that optimism bias is closely linked
to anticipation of reward (Sharot, 2011). In fact, in humans, optimistic
expectancies are usually directed toward a rewarding goal (Bateson,
2016), and anticipating reward is the crucial motivating force in opti-
mism bias shown by non-human animals (e.g., Matheson et al., 2008).
One major component of reward is “wanting”. It describes individuals
being motivated to strive for reward through both unconscious in-
centive salience processes and conscious desires for incentives or cog-
nitive goals (Berridge and Kringelbach, 2008; Pool et al., 2016b). Be-
cause it represents the phase of reward expectation, wanting is an
important factor in shaping optimism bias. In contrast to wanting (i.e.,
reward expectation), “liking” (i.e., reward consummation) represents
the pleasure component of reward, and “learning” (i.e., reward satiety)
refers to associations and representations about rewards (Berridge and
Kringelbach, 2011). Both liking and learning might additionally con-
tribute to optimism bias by determining the hedonic value of the ex-
pected reward and inﬂuencing subsequent predictions about future
rewards. The three phases of Berridge and Kringelbach’s model can,
therefore, be essential to the formation of optimism bias and its main-
tenance over time.
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2.1. Relevance of optimism bias
In everyday life, optimism bias ensures that people engage in a task,
a crucial and beneﬁcial aspect when a task is diﬃcult and its outcome
self-relevant (Armor and Taylor, 1998; Shepperd et al., 2015). Hence,
being optimistic about one´s future can help in obtaining rewards,
which in turn justiﬁes that optimism bias exists. In fact, optimism bias
might even have derived from evolutionary advantages. More precisely,
when a situation is uncertain and risky, optimism has been suggested to
help people make better decisions and avoid mistakes, thereby con-
tributing to survival (Bortolotti and Antrobus, 2015). In line with this
idea, overly optimistic expectancies are not human speciﬁc, but have
been reported in animals as well (Brydges et al., 2011; Douglas et al.,
2012; Harding et al., 2004; Matheson et al., 2008; Richter et al., 2012).
In humans, optimism bias functions on a continuum, with normal
stamping having great beneﬁts and extreme stamping having dramatic
negative consequences. For instance, optimism bias is thought to foster
physical and mental health (Garrett et al., 2014; Hevey et al., 2014;
Korn et al., 2014). Whereas healthy people display optimism bias and
update their expectancies of future events selectively into an optimistic
(i.e., desirable) direction when feedback suggests modifying them, pa-
tients with depression display no bias at all, or even pessimism bias, and
update their expectancies in both the optimistic (i.e., desirable) and the
pessimistic (i.e., undesirable) direction (note that causality of the as-
sociation between depression and lowered optimism bias remains to be
investigated; Garrett et al., 2014; Korn et al., 2014; Strunk et al., 2006).
However, extreme optimism bias can also have dramatic negative
consequences and costs emerging from it. Individuals characterized by
optimism bias underestimate health risks (Weinstein et al., 2005, 2004)
and refrain from showing preventive health behavior (Davidson and
Prkachin, 1997; Pligt, 1998), engage in risky activities because they are
overly optimistic about future payoﬀs (e.g., Calderon, 1993; Linnet
et al., 2012), and possibly consume substances because they over-
estimate the positive eﬀects of a drug and underestimate its negative
eﬀects (e.g., Dillard et al., 2009; Fromme and D’Amico, 2000; Goldberg
and Fischhoﬀ, 2000). In conclusion, therefore, a systematic investiga-
tion of normal and pathological types of optimism bias is of great in-
terest for individuals and society. Important insights can be gained by
looking into the neurocognitive mechanisms underlying optimism bias.
2.2. Neural correlates of optimism bias
Recent functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) studies in-
vestigated the neural mechanisms of optimism bias and found altered
activity in the following key areas: (a) the rostral anterior cingulate
cortex (rACC), possibly extending into the ventromedial prefrontal
cortex (vmPFC); (b) the amygdala; and (c) the inferior frontal gyrus
(IFG) (Blair et al., 2013; Sharot et al., 2007; see Fig. 1 for visualization
of peak voxel activations reported by studies referred to in this section
and see Table 1 for included studies; note that these structures are not
speciﬁc to optimism bias, but are relevant to many psychological
characteristics such as emotion processing in general; Phan et al., 2002;
Sabatinelli et al., 2011). Whereas increased activity in the rACC has
been related to optimism bias for positive events (increased probability
of positive events occurring to oneself compared with others), de-
creased activity in the dorsomedial prefrontal cortex and the insula has
been associated with optimism bias for negative events (decreased
probability of negative events occurring to oneself compared with
others; Blair et al., 2013).
Along these lines, activity in the rACC and the amygdala has been
shown to be highly correlated when participants are forming positive
(compared with negative) expectancies about the future (Sharot et al.,
2007). The amygdala is central for emotional processing (Ochsner et al.,
2012; Phelps, 2006) and assumed to index personal salience
(Cunningham and Brosch, 2012; Liberzon et al., 2003). Among other
things, the amygdala is critically involved in many diﬀerent aspects of
emotions (e.g., development of fear, emotional appraisal and recogni-
tion, perception and memory of aﬀective stimuli, reward learning and
appetitive behavior; LeDoux, 2003; Wassum and Izquierdo, 2015) and
may also be involved in forming emotional expectancies. Sharot et al.
(2007) suggest that the rACC regulates emotional and motivational
signals generated by (and stored in) the amygdala.
Although the rACC and the amygdala are considered fundamental,
optimism bias may rely on characteristic activations and deactivations
in additional areas. As described in Section 2.1, healthy people show an
updating asymmetry in an optimistic direction (only updating future
expectancies in a desirable but not an undesirable direction when
presented with disconﬁrming evidence; Sharot et al., 2011). Brain ac-
tivity in the left IFG, left and right medial frontal cortex, right cere-
bellum, and vmPFC was positively correlated with desirable updating of
expectancies (Kuzmanovic et al., 2016; Sharot et al., 2011). Ad-
ditionally, activity in the vmPFC and right IFG correlated negatively
with undesirable updating of expectancies, thus further supporting the
idea that undesirable information is not integrated when the right IFG is
activated (Kuzmanovic et al., 2016; Sharot et al., 2011). In addition,
optimism bias can be magniﬁed by administering L-DOPA, thereby
increasing dopamine function and impairing updating of undesirable
information (Sharot et al., 2012a). Consistent with this picture, the
right IFG, an area known to have projections from dopaminergic neu-
rons (Fallon and Moore, 1978), has been shown to be involved when
patients with depression update their beliefs toward an undesirable
direction (Garret et al., 2014).
3. Reward-related attention bias
A reward-related bias is observed not only in expectancies (as de-
scribed in Section 2 on optimism bias), but also in attention. In line with
the outlined relation between optimism bias and reward, recent studies
imply that reward-associated (i.e., desirable) stimuli capture visual at-
tention to a greater extent than neutral and sometimes negative stimuli
do. This phenomenon has been shown by altered reaction times and
biased eye movements when reward-related stimuli capture visual
Fig. 1. Peak voxel activations reported in studies on optimism bias. See Table 1 for a list
of included studies. Red dots represent stronger activations in optimism bias, blue dots
represent stronger deactivations in optimism bias, and green dots represent stronger ac-
tivations in biased optimistic updating. Only data reported by studies on healthy parti-
cipants are displayed in the ﬁgure. Peak voxel coordinates are depicted as dots (size:
3 mm) on a Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI) brain, as provided in the Mango 4.0
Desktop Application for Windows (Research Imaging Institute, The University of Texas
Health Science Center at San Antonio; http://ric.uthscsa.edu/mango/). If peak activa-
tions were originally reported in Talairach coordinates, either they were converted to
MNI coordinates by using the Yale BioImage Suite Application (http://sprout022.sprout.
yale.edu/mni2tal/mni2tal.html), or original MNI coordinates were requested from the
study authors. Video 1 displays an animated version of this ﬁgure with the brain rotating
360°.
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attention during a task (Anderson and Yantis, 2012; Theeuwes and
Belopolsky, 2012). Attention capture is most often considered to be an
automatic phenomenon, independent of strategic top-down control
(Theeuwes and Belopolsky, 2012): Even when participants have a
strong top-down goal to look for a speciﬁc target, a currently task-ir-
relevant but salient distractor can capture attention (Balcetis et al.,
2012; Godijn and Theeuwes, 2002; Miendlarzewska et al., 2016).
3.1. Relevance of reward-related attention bias
An attention bias to reward-related information enables people to
eﬃciently detect events in an environment in which several stimuli
compete for access to limited attentional resources (Pool et al., 2016a).
Rewarding stimuli are suggested to have a positive hedonic value and
therefore elicit wanting and approach behavior (Berridge and
Kringelbach, 2008; Schultz, 2004). If people preferably attend to
rewarding stimuli in their environment in everyday life, they are more
likely to perceive chances to maximize future gains, which in turn
contributes to survival ﬁtness (Schultz, 2004). Having said this, it is
correct to assume that attention bias to rewarding stimuli might have
derived from an evolutionary beneﬁt. In support of this idea, such
biased attention does not seem to be human speciﬁc but is also dis-
played by animals (Paul et al., 2005; similar to optimism bias; see
Section 2.1).
In humans, biased attention toward reward-related stimuli plays an
important role in the clinical domain. Mirroring research on optimism
bias, attention bias toward rewarding stimuli is not shown by depressed
or by dysphoric people, nor is it shown by formerly depressed people, in
comparison to healthy controls (Duque and Vázquez, 2015; Gotlib
et al., 2004; Joorman and Gotlib, 2007; Koster et al., 2005; Murphey
et al., 1999). On the other hand, some clinical symptoms are char-
acterized by the existence of positive biases, and these biases do not
need to be restricted to the speciﬁc diagnosis. For example, patients
with addictions are characterized by an attention bias not only for
substance-related reward stimuli, but also for non-substance-related
reward stimuli (Anderson et al., 2013). Moreover, neural indices of
biased attention toward (socially rewarding) happy face pictures have
been associated with a risk for psychiatric and behavioral symptoms
such as rule breaking and social problems in anxious youth (Bunford
et al., 2016). It is thus important to examine the neural underpinnings
of normal and dysfunctional attention bias to better understand their
respective underlying mechanisms.
3.2. Neural correlates of reward-related attention bias
Recent fMRI studies on the neural mechanisms underlying attention
bias to reward-related stimuli have found altered activity in the fol-
lowing key areas: (a) the ACC, (b) the posterior cingulate cortex (PCC),
(c) the posterior parietal cortex (PPC), (d) the amygdala, and (e) the
orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) (Armony and Dolan, 2002; Hickey et al.,
2010; Mohanty et al., 2008; Pool et al., 2016a; Small et al., 2005; see
Fig. 2 for visualization of peak voxel activations reported by studies
referred to in this section and see Table 2 for a list of included studies).
As is the case for optimism bias, the ACC, an area strongly inter-
connected with dopaminergic structures (Marín et al., 1998), turns out
to be a critical structure underlying reward-related visual attention. For
instance, the ACC response to reward feedback predicted the magnitude
of reward-related attention bias in a visual search paradigm (Hickey
et al., 2010). Reward-related mesolimbic dopamine might bias atten-
tion toward reward-associated stimuli rather than less beneﬁcial sti-
muli. This was the case even when people knew that attending to re-
ward-associated features would be counterproductive and result in
Table 1
List of studies on optimism bias included in Fig. 1. The table shows the respective brain areas found and the coordinates of peak voxel activation in MNI and Talairach space. Coordinates
that were originally reported in the studies are written in italics.
Study Hemisphere Brain Area MNI coordinates Talairach coordinates (De) activation Study content
X Y Z X Y Z
Blair et al. (2013) R rACC 5 32 12 A Optimism bias
L dmPFC −6 22 43 D
L Insula −27 26 3 D
Sharot et al. (2007) R Amygdala 21 −7 −21 20 −9 −14 A Optimism bias
L rACC −11 47 −1 −11 42 −1 A
Sharot et al. (2011) L IFG −58 22 0 −58 21 −1 A More desirable updating
B mPFC −10 62 34 −10 62 28 A
R Cerebellum 34 −80 −38 33 −79 −28 A
R IFG 46 12 10 46 12 9 A Less undesirable updating
R IFG 60 10 10 60 10 9 A
Kuzmanovic et al. (2016) L vmPFC −6 34 −6 A Favorable self-related updating
Fig. 2. Peak voxel activations reported in studies on attention bias. See Table 2 for a list of
included studies. Red dots represent stronger activations in expectancy-related attention
capture, blue dots represent stronger deactivations in expectancy-related attention cap-
ture, and green dots represent stronger activations in threat-related attention bias. Only
data reported by studies on visual attention are displayed in the ﬁgure. Peak voxel co-
ordinates are depicted as dots (size: 3 mm) on an MNI brain, as provided in the Mango 4.0
Desktop Application for Windows (Research Imaging Institute, The University of Texas
Health Science Center at San Antonio; http://ric.uthscsa.edu/mango/). Peak activations
that were originally reported in Talairach coordinates have been converted to MNI co-
ordinates by using the Yale BioImage Suite Application (http://sprout022.sprout.yale.
edu/mni2tal/mni2tal.html). Video 2 displays an animated version of this ﬁgure with the
brain rotating 360°.
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suboptimal outcomes (Hickey et al., 2010; the process could again be
triggered by wanting and is possibly mediated by optimistic ex-
pectancies formed in the ACC; see Section 4.4 for further details).
Attention can be inﬂuenced by object saliency in a “bottom-up”
manner, meaning that salient stimuli attract people's attention auto-
matically as an output of the sensitized dopaminergic system (i.e., in
particular concerning initial orienting of attention; Field and Cox, 2008;
Franken, 2003). Thus, the primary structures associated with proces-
sing of salient stimuli are the amygdala and insula. Whereas the
amygdala has been observed to play a key role in the detection and
attribution of salience (Liberzon et al., 2003), the insula is suggested to
act as a hub structure within a bigger salience network (e.g., comprising
the ACC). The purpose is to detect salient events, activate other brain
structures needed to access attention and memory resources, and gen-
erate appropriate behavioral responses to salient stimuli (Menon and
Uddin, 2010).
Moreover, attention can be controlled in a “top-down” manner (e.g.,
by monetary incentives signaling reward; Small et al., 2005). In this
context, two processes of top-down attentional control were examined
in a target detection task: visual spatial expectancy (the degree to which
a predictive spatial cue beneﬁts performance) and disengagement (the
degree to which a misleading spatial cue diminishes performance).
Whereas visual spatial expectancy was associated with activity in
limbic regions and the PCC, disengagement was associated with activity
in the inferior parietal lobule. These processes of the attention network
were enhanced through monetary incentives. Findings show that ex-
pecting incentives (i.e., optimistic expectancies) can boost neural pro-
cessing within the attention network in a top-down manner, which can
be important in fulﬁlling the current behavioral goal (Small et al., 2005;
Hahn and Gronlund, 2007). In summary, reward-related information
seems to be integrated with spatial attention in the parietal and cin-
gulate cortices.
In line with this assumption, stronger functional coupling between
the PPC and PCC was present in attention bias toward reward-related
targets (i.e., food images when participants were hungry) in a covert
spatial attention paradigm (Mohanty et al., 2008). In this study, activity
in the OFC, the intraparietal sulcus, and the PCC was correlated with
how fast attention shifted toward reward-related targets after
participants had seen spatial cues indicating the location at which they
should expect the target. Supporting this ﬁnding, Engelmann et al.
(2009) reported that reward-related incentives modulated attention,
which accompanied increased activation in fronto-parietal sites, in-
cluding the ACC and PCC, as well as nodes of the reward system such as
the caudate and substantia nigra.
In conclusion, the PPC and PCC integrate motivational information
with visual attention, a process that is essential in everyday life
(Mohanty et al., 2008). Moreover, several structures, such as the
amygdala, the ACC, and the PCC, have been demonstrated to play a key
role in both optimism and attention bias. Along these lines, the studies
by Mohanty et al. (2008) and Small et al. (2005) provide good examples
of expectancy-attention interactions (e.g., visual spatial expectancy
determining the top-down control of attention) and therefore give a
good starting point for our interactive cognitive bias framework. We
now introduce the theoretical and empirical work that further corro-
borates our suggestion that reward-related biases in expectancies and
attention should be examined by using an integrative approach.
4. Possible interactions between optimism bias and attention bias
After reviewing the literature on optimism and attention bias in
isolation, we now begin with the core focus of our article, namely, the
link between optimism bias and attention bias. In what follows, we
show that ideas derived from theoretical considerations converge with
existing empirical data on the interplay between optimism and atten-
tion processes. These converging ideas, in concert with widely over-
lapping neural activations at the basis of optimism and attention bias
(see Sections 2, 3, and 4.3), give strong hints that the two phenomena
interact, which is the central statement of our framework. To reveal the
motivation for our framework, we ﬁrst draw on theoretical models in
favor of a link between optimism and attention bias (Section 4.1).
Thereafter, by ﬁrst describing empirical support for such an association
(Section 4.2) and shared neural networks (Section 4.3), we thoroughly
outline our framework, which is organized around three core princi-
ples: First, optimism bias and attention bias do not work in isolation,
but enforce each other in both directions. Second, both optimism bias
and attention bias rely on activations in overlapping brain areas (such
Table 2
List of studies on attention bias included in Fig. 2. The table shows the respective brain areas found and the coordinates of peak voxel activation in MNI and Talairach space. Coordinates
that were originally reported in the studies are written in italics.
Study Hemisphere Brain Area MNI coordinates Talairach coordinates (De) activation Study content
X Y Z X Y Z
Armony and Dolan (2002) L ACC −13 −7 67 −12 −2 60 A Negative attention bias
R ACC 4 8 64 4 12 58 A
L Parietal cortex −33 −54 63 −32 −50 58 A
L OFC −33 50 −8 −32 46 −6 A
Small et al. (2005) R Inferior parietal lobule 63 −27 27 A Motivated attention disengagement
R PCC 21 −39 36 A Motivated visual spatial expectancy
R ACC 9 30 30 A
L Parahippocampal gyrus −24 −9 −33 A
R Parahippocampal gyrus 33 −15 −21 A
L OFC −18 42 −9 A
Mohanty et al. (2008) L PCC −9 −42 15 A Expectancy-related attention
R PPC 21 −57 48 A
R mOFC 21 30 −18 A
L lOFC −45 33 −18 D
Engelmann et al. (2009) R PCC 6 −29 43 6 −26 40 A Expectancy-related attention
L PCC −9 −31 43 −8 −28 40 A
R ACC 4 20 39 4 21 36 A
L ACC −3 19 39 −2 20 36 A
R Caudate 14 11 10 13 9 11 A
L Caudate −8 8 4 −8 5 7 A
R Substantia nigra 9 −17 −17 8 −18 −10 A
L Substantia nigra −9 −17 −13 −8 −18 −7 A
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as the ACC and PCC). Third, both phenomena are characterized by si-
milar underlying motivational processes (i.e., striving for reward pos-
sibly initiated by limbic structures), a fact likely related to the ob-
servation of shared neural activations of the two biases. In conclusion,
we propose three mechanisms of neural communication between opti-
mism bias and attention bias by taking into account the overlapping
neural substrates that have been reviewed (Section 4.4).
4.1. Theoretical models on the link between cognitive biases
As currently little empirical work has been done on the relation
between optimism bias and reward-related attention bias, we sub-
stantially base our framework on theoretical models that are in favor of
links between biases displayed in diﬀerent domains of information
processing. First, we explain how established models of psycho-
pathology (Beck et al., 1979; Joorman et al., 2007; Williams et al.,
1997), including the combined cognitive biases hypothesis (Hirsch
et al., 2006), propose the general need to study cognitive biases in an
integrative way. These theoretical approaches, hence, are fully in line
with the rationale for our own framework. Second, we elaborate how
predictive coding theory (Summerﬁeld et al., 2006a; Zelano et al.,
2011) and our interpretation of Broadbent’s ﬁlter model of attention
(1958) can provide further support for a connection between the two
speciﬁc phenomena of interest in the present framework, namely,
biased (optimistic) expectancies and attention. Third, we demonstrate
the numerous important implications that an integrative view on cog-
nitive biases will have for future research and clinical practice.
Inﬂuential models of psychopathology, such as Beck’s cognitive
theory of depression (1979), suggest that negativity biases are crucial
for the development and maintenance of psychological disorders. Beck’s
cognitive triad refers to negative views about the self, the world (in-
cluding aspects of attention), and the future (including expectancies)
shown by patients with depression. According to Beck, these negative
cognitions contribute to various symptoms of depression, such as
apathy, paralysis of the will, and suicidal wishes. More recent models of
depression additionally introduce the interactive nature of these cog-
nitive biases. For instance, an interplay of biased attention, memory,
and interpretation has been proposed to act at the basis for depression
(Joorman et al., 2007; Williams et al., 1997). Together, these models of
psychopathology have led to the evolution of the combined cognitive
biases hypothesis in clinical research. It holds that negative cognitive
biases (e.g., in attention, interpretation, and self-imagery) rarely exist
in isolation (Everaert et al., 2012; Hirsch et al., 2006), but rather in-
teract and mutually enforce each other. Recently, this perspective has
been extended to additionally include negative expectancy biases (Aue
and Okon-Singer, 2015).
Even though these models of psychopathology (Beck et al., 1979;
Joorman et al., 2007; Williams et al., 1997) are widely accepted and
implemented in psychotherapy, research on the inﬂuence of cognitive
biases on psychopathological symptoms has mainly examined the dif-
ferent biases separately, thereby neglecting important information
about their interactive eﬀects (Everaert et al., 2016). Going beyond
such restricted considerations, the combined cognitive bias hypothesis
constitutes an important starting point for future integrative in-
vestigations on cognitive biases. Among other things, it guides research
in the ﬁeld by proposing possible mechanisms in psychopathology,
including speciﬁc directions of interaction between diverse biases.
Studying interactive and mutually enforcing cognitive biases in
psychopathology can have pivotal implications for clinical research and
practice. In clinical research, it can, for instance, reveal how speciﬁc
interactions among cognitive biases contribute to complex chains of
causality that lead to psychopathologies or create conditions that im-
pede successful treatment (e.g., because one bias mediates or moderates
the association between another bias and certain psychopathological
symptoms). Moreover, in clinical practice, it can lead to more ﬁne-
grained diagnoses of patients (e.g., by taking into account how the
strength and time course of interacting cognitive biases inﬂuence the
severity of symptoms) and can improve the eﬀectiveness of con-
temporary treatment options by simultaneously targeting multiple
cognitive mechanisms involved in the development and maintenance of
psychological diseases (e.g., during focused cognitive bias modiﬁcation
training; Aue and Okon-Singer, 2015; Everaert et al., 2012; Hirsch
et al., 2006). In sum, leading models of psychopathology, in particular
the combined cognitive biases hypothesis described above, present
strong arguments for the interaction of negative biases displayed in
psychological disorders (Everaert et al., 2014, 2013, 2012; Hirsch et al.,
2006).
With the current framework, we extend this compelling perspective
by suggesting that the same holds true for positive reward-related
biases. Attention bias, which makes people preferably attend to reward-
related information, can well accompany optimism bias, which makes
people overly optimistic about future rewards. More precisely, we
postulate that optimism bias increases when people preferably attend to
rewarding information in their environment and that reward-related
attention bias increases when people have overly optimistic ex-
pectancies about their future (for a more detailed outline of these causal
links, see Section 4.4). Furthermore, application of the combined cog-
nitive biases hypothesis to reward-related biases implies that additional
cognitive biases (e.g., in memory) interact with the proposed link be-
tween optimism and attention bias (see Section 5 for further details).
Eﬀects of reward-related biases are proposed to mutually reinforce each
other, thereby establishing and conserving a positive outlook and
mental health in the long run. Therefore, interactions of reward-related
biases are especially interesting for life quality (e.g., how mutually
enforcing biases maintain well-being during the ups and downs of ev-
eryday life) but also for the prevention of psychopathology (e.g., how
psychoeducation about causal inﬂuences among reward-related biases
can prevent negative mutual enforcement and increase positive mutual
enforcement before a disease is developed).
Compared with the combined cognitive biases hypothesis and
models of psychopathology proposing that diﬀerent cognitive biases are
generally linked, predictive coding theory speciﬁcally emphasizes the
interplay of expectancy and attention processes. Furthermore, its pos-
tulates are not restricted to negative cognitions. Predictive coding
theory states that when expecting certain outcomes (of any valence) in
the future, humans use prior experience to create a mental template or
“search image” and then compare incoming sensory information to this
template (e.g., Summerﬁeld et al., 2006a; Zelano et al., 2011). This
interplay helps to eﬃciently process a wealth of sensory information
and facilitates the choice of subsequent behavior. It has been suggested
that the predictive template created in the brain is updated according to
incoming information, implying that the process constantly repeats
over time (Rao and Ballard, 1999).
Whether predictive coding theory can transfer to optimism bias and
attention bias has yet to be examined empirically and therefore con-
stitutes an interesting aspect that has just recently started to be in-
vestigated. It is imaginable that individuals characterized by overly
optimistic expectancies create a mental image that directs their atten-
tion to conﬁrming reward-related sensory input. In fact, empirical
evidence supports such a mechanism (Kress et al., submitted; see Sec-
tion 4.2 for details). Although such conﬁrming sensory input stabilizes
optimism bias over time, disconﬁrming sensory input that reaches at-
tentional awareness can lead to an update of the mental template (Rao
and Ballard, 1999), thereby counteracting optimism bias. Empirical
evidence about such processes that are implied by predictive coding
theory will guide neurocognitive research in the ﬁeld of cognitive bias
interactions because it directly proposes a direction of inﬂuence (in-
ﬂuence of expectancies on attention). Studying such causal inﬂuences
of optimistic expectancies on attention allows, for instance, the in-
vestigation of how optimism bias is maintained over time (e.g., because
optimistic expectancies guide attention toward conﬁrming rewarding
evidence, which, in turn, further strengthens optimism bias; see Kress
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et al., submitted, for supportive empirical ﬁndings).
In contrast to predictive coding theory that implies expectancy in-
ﬂuences on attention, Broadbent’s ﬁlter model of attention (1958)
claims that selective attention acts as a sensory ﬁlter that prevents the
information-processing system from being overloaded. Prioritized se-
lective attention to rewarding (often self-relevant) information then
leads to preferable processing of such desirable information (Pessoa,
2005; Pessoa et al., 2002). This again should strengthen optimism bias
because future expectancies are generally based on available informa-
tion (Metcalfe, 1998). Empirical evidence for such inﬂuences of atten-
tion on optimism bias have outstanding implications. For instance, such
evidence can reveal that optimism bias and its beneﬁts, such as the
initiation of goal-directed behavior, are rooted in underlying atten-
tional mechanisms and that these beneﬁts therefore cannot necessarily
be solely attributed to optimism bias itself.
Broadbent’s ﬁlter model basically implies the opposite direction of
inﬂuence (inﬂuence of attention on expectancies) to that of predictive
coding theory (inﬂuence of expectancies on attention). Both theories
reveal the importance of examining causal relationships (i.e., directions
of inﬂuence) between diﬀerent biases and therefore guide future re-
search in the ﬁeld away from correlational and toward experimental
studies. Only these studies can reveal the mechanisms underlying
healthy and pathological functioning, such as speciﬁc circumscribed
expectancy-attention interactions contributing to well-being or symp-
toms of psychopathology.
In summary, the three theoretical approaches presented in this
section provide strong supportive evidence for a link between optimism
and attention bias. Whereas models of psychopathology, particularly
the combined cognitive biases hypothesis, suggest that diﬀerent cog-
nitive biases are generally linked and should be examined by using an
integrative approach, predictive coding theory is in line with the idea of
causal inﬂuences of optimism bias on attention bias, and Broadbent’s
ﬁlter model implies causal inﬂuences of attention bias on optimism
bias. From an integration of these approaches, we postulate bidirec-
tional inﬂuences between both biases (see Section 4.4). After having
outlined these theoretical models in favor of our framework, we now
continue by brieﬂy reviewing the ﬁrst empirical ﬁndings that further
substantiate our claim of a close association between optimism and
attention bias.
4.2. Empirical evidence of optimism-attention associations
The ﬁrst core principle of our framework states that optimism bias
and attention bias do not work in isolation but enforce each other in
both directions. In support of this principle, ﬁrst empirical ﬁndings by
Peters et al. (2015) revealed an eﬀect of experimentally induced state
optimism (i.e., temporarily increased optimistic expectancies induced
through external manipulation; Peters et al., 2015) on attention to faces
displaying diﬀerent emotional expressions. Even though, in general,
their optimism manipulation did not inﬂuence gaze behavior, the au-
thors observed an eﬀect of state optimism in a post hoc analysis: Those
participants who displayed increased state optimism because of the
manipulation looked at angry (i.e., socially punishing) faces for a sig-
niﬁcantly shorter time. Moreover, they looked at joyful (i.e., socially
rewarding) faces for a nearly signiﬁcant longer time. To our knowledge,
this is the ﬁrst study that has examined how visual attention is causally
inﬂuenced by induced state optimism that likely shares important fea-
tures with optimism bias (although both phenomena are characterized
by optimistic expectancies about the future, these expectancies are not
necessarily unrealistic or biased in state optimism), thus supporting our
claim regarding the existence of optimism-attention bias interactions.
In line with this study, the ﬁrst evidence from our own laboratory
suggests that induced optimistic and pessimistic expectancies alter at-
tention to rewarding and punishing stimuli, with optimistic ex-
pectancies having a stronger eﬀect on attention deployment than pes-
simistic expectancies (Peters et al., 2015, induced state optimism at the
beginning of the experiment; in contrast, we induced optimistic and
pessimistic expectancies by verbal cues on a trial-to-trial basis in our
study; Kress et al., submitted). Although optimistic expectancies
strongly biased attention toward rewarding compared with punishing
stimuli in our experiment, pessimistic expectancies had either no eﬀect
or a weaker eﬀect on attention deployment to punishing versus re-
warding stimuli. An important consideration is that this observation is
generally in accordance with our framework’s postulate of causal re-
lations between optimism and attention bias. Moreover, this ﬁnding in
our laboratory delineates important diﬀerences between biased reward-
and punishment-related processing (e.g., optimism vs. pessimism) and
strongly supports the idea that optimism has an outstanding impact on
other types of cognitive processing (i.e., optimism exerts stronger in-
ﬂuences on cognitive biases than pessimism). Such diﬀerences between
reward- and punishment-related processing imply that inﬂuences
among cognitive biases can be valence speciﬁc. Further details about
how such valence-speciﬁc biased cognitive processing contributes to
health and psychopathology can have crucial implications for everyday
life and clinical practice.
Generally in line with the idea of causal inﬂuences of optimistic
expectancies on attention (Kress et al., submitted), expectancy cues
have been shown to guide visual attention to reward-related stimuli and
to modify attention via top-down control outside the area of optimism
bias research. In a covered attention shift paradigm, participants re-
acted faster to spatially cued reward-related targets that were motiva-
tionally relevant compared with those that were motivationally irrele-
vant (i.e., food pictures when participants were hungry vs. full;
Mohanty et al., 2008). Other studies showed that attention to socially
rewarding stimuli (happy as opposed to angry faces) could be enhanced
through top-down modulation (i.e., by speciﬁc instructions or cues;
Hahn and Gronlund, 2007; Williams et al., 2005). These studies thus
give further hints that inﬂuences of expectancies on attention deploy-
ment exist in the reward-related domain. Even if these ﬁndings do not
directly refer to optimism bias, they are supportive of our claim of
expectancy-attention interactions because they touch upon ex-
pectancies about future outcomes. Furthermore, they correspond well
with Peters et al. (2015) results concerning the inﬂuence of state op-
timism on attention to happy and angry faces.
One can ﬁnd further inspiration from the literature on expectancy-
attention interactions in the negative domain (Aue et al., 2013b; Aue
and Okon-Singer, 2015; Mohanty et al., 2009). For negative aﬀective
phenomena, a strong correlation between attention deployment and
expectancies has already been revealed (Aue et al., 2013b). Moreover,
experimentally manipulated expectancies, induced by prior cues in a
visual search task, causally inﬂuenced attention to neutral stimuli, but –
interestingly – not consistently to negative stimuli (Aue et al., 2016,
2013a; Burra and Kerzel, 2013; Mohanty et al., 2009). Similarities and
divergences between positive and negative cognitive bias interactions
still need to be revealed, an aspect that should substantially advance
theorizing and prevention in clinical psychology, as well as the adap-
tation of individual treatments.
In summary, behavioral studies reported in this section provide
supportive evidence that optimism bias and attention bias are related
and that optimism causally inﬂuences attention deployment (similar
interactions have been proposed in animal research; Mendl et al.,
2009). Behavioral studies revealed an association between expectancies
and attention not only by using negative aﬀective (Aue et al., 2013b;
Mohanty et al., 2009) and neutral stimuli (Aue et al., 2016, 2013a;
Burra and Kerzel, 2013), but also by using appetitive and reward-re-
lated stimuli in experiments that did not directly address optimism bias
(Hahn and Gronlund, 2007; Mohanty et al., 2008; Williams et al.,
2005). Most important, state optimism and induced optimistic ex-
pectancies – two manipulations representing important aspects of op-
timism bias – have recently been shown to causally inﬂuence sub-
sequent attention deployment (Kress et al., submitted; Peters et al.,
2015). Such evidence, which is in line with the idea of a link between
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optimism and attention bias, has yet to be corroborated by additional
empirical data in the behavioral domain. Also of note is that, although
we were able to outline supportive empirical evidence for causal in-
ﬂuences of optimistic expectancies on attention, no empirical evidence
is yet available on causal inﬂuences of attention on optimism bias.
Thus, future studies should straightforwardly and systematically target
this direction of inﬂuence.
The continuous adaption and combination of currently dominant
experimental paradigms in each area will enable researchers to uncover
the central interplay between cognitive biases. Demonstrating causal
associations between biases has crucial implications for future cognitive
research about both optimism and attention bias. Such a research
strategy has, for instance, the potential to reveal fundamental operating
principles at the basis of both biases, thereby contributing to our un-
derstanding of positively biased cognitions and current theorizing.
Moreover, it should reveal important commonalities and divergences in
the cognitive mechanisms underlying health and psychopathology. An
important aspect of cognitive functioning in health and disease is that
much can be learned from knowledge about the neural foundations of
associations between cognitive biases. In the next sections, we therefore
integrate ﬁndings from neuroimaging studies on optimism bias and
attention bias (Section 4.3) and propose diﬀerent ways in which the
corresponding neural mechanisms interact (Section 4.4).
4.3. Shared neural networks in optimism bias and attention bias
The second core principle of our framework aﬃrms that both op-
timism bias and reward-related attention bias rely on activations in
overlapping and interacting brain areas. Key areas identiﬁed in re-
search on optimism bias (Section 2.2) and attention bias (Section 3.2)
do indeed overlap considerably. In line with this principle, recent fMRI
studies on optimism bias also propose shared mechanisms and conform
to the idea that biases in expectancies are shaped by biases in attention
or vice versa (Sharot, 2011; Sharot et al., 2007). For instance, the ACC
has been implicated in optimism bias (Blair et al., 2013; Sharot et al.,
2011, 2007) and was suggested to guide attention toward rewarding
information while people imagine future events (see Hickey et al.,
2010, for its implication in reward-related enhancement of selective
attention). Moreover, activity in this region has been found to vary as a
function of amygdala activity in optimism bias (Sharot et al., 2007),
suggesting that the salience of an anticipated outcome shapes the extent
of the optimism bias displayed (Bastardi et al., 2011; Weinstein, 1980).
Further supporting the idea of a link between optimism and attention
bias, object saliency and associated amygdala activity have also been
related to attentional capture (Field and Cox, 2002; Franken, 2003).
Besides amygdala and ACC activity, connectivity between occipital
areas associated with visual attention and the human reward system
(striatum), as well as with the PCC, has been observed to be at the basis
of optimism bias (Aue et al., 2012). Again, there are convincing com-
monalities with ﬁndings on attention bias. For example, the PCC has
been reported to be critically involved in selective attention (Corbetta
and Shulman, 2002). Such an observation is consistent with the idea
that the more the PCC is recruited when a speciﬁc piece of information
is encoded, the more this information’s valence will inﬂuence the
overall impression formed (Schiller et al., 2009). Indeed, the PCC has
been proposed to be a hub structure connecting motivation-related
processing with top-down control of attention (Mohanty et al., 2008;
Small et al., 2005). Thus, we suggest that the striatum and the amyg-
dala, in concert with the PCC, initiate shifts in visual attention that then
contribute to how future expectancies are formed (see Section 4.4, ﬁrst
mechanism, for details).
Notably, in accordance with the ﬁndings outlined earlier and with
our claims, Rolls (2013) proposes that attention and expectancies re-
cruit a common neural network: Mediated by the ACC and the OFC,
both “cognition” (including expectancies; original term used by Rolls,
2013) and attention exert top-down inﬂuences on the processing of
bottom-up sensory inputs. These top-down inﬂuences can facilitate
activation of selective neuronal assemblies and inhibit other neuronal
assemblies in the early information processing stream. Consequently,
certain stimulus representations will be enhanced and others sup-
pressed (Desimone and Duncan, 1995). In this way, subsequent pro-
cessing will be biased. Along these lines, selective attention can be as-
sumed to inﬂuence activity in early visual processing areas, possibly
mediated by the functional connectivity between fronto-parietal brain
regions associated with attentional control and the human reward
system (e.g., dorsal striatum; Padmala and Pessoa, 2011; Pessoa and
Engelmann, 2010). What remains to be investigated is whether or not
this is part of the mechanism by which attentional processes bias ex-
pectancies or vice versa.
Direct evidence for the neural mechanisms that we propose to un-
derlie generally beneﬁcial optimism-attention interactions will not just
support behavioral ﬁndings in the ﬁeld: Apart from revealing patterns
of healthy neural processing, such ﬁndings also have the potential to
pinpoint vulnerability factors for psychopathology by specifying acti-
vations that are responsible for a disruption of the generally healthy
neural patterns. Moreover, documentation of neural interactions during
the normal interplay of optimism and attention bias will have important
implications for pharmacological treatment of psychological disorders
in which none of the biases are displayed. For instance, drugs that in-
ﬂuence the dopamine system can be used to alter important processes in
the brain, thereby enhancing reward-related biases and their interplay
(in line with this idea, L-Dopa has already been shown to enhance
optimism bias; Sharot et al., 2012a).
Before these ultimate goals are reached, however, causal inﬂuences
between optimism and attention bias and their neural correlates have
yet to be purposefully examined. Because direct neuroscientiﬁc evi-
dence about the association between optimistic expectancies and at-
tention in the reward-related domain is to date missing, research on
optimism-attention bias interactions might be inspired by research in
the negative bias domain. In the negative domain, the association be-
tween visual attention and expectancies has indeed been shown to be
mediated by activity in key regions such as the OFC, the ACC, and the
precuneus (Aue et al., 2013b). Moreover, in a visual search task, in
which attention to angry facial expressions was inﬂuenced by prior
knowledge about the location and type of the target stimulus, spatially
informative cues (predicting the location of a subsequent target) acti-
vated the fusiform gyrus and parts of the frontoparietal spatial attention
network (such as the intraparietal sulcus and the frontal eye ﬁeld), and
emotionally informative cues (predicting angry faces) additionally ac-
tivated limbic areas, including the amygdala (Mohanty et al., 2009).
Notably, the authors propose that expectancy-related emotional in-
formation is essential to generate a top-down salience map that guides
visual attention. Together, these ﬁndings suggest that the spatial at-
tention network, in concert with limbic areas, constitutes the neural
substrates at the basis of expectancy-driven emotional spatial attention.
As outlined in greater detail in the next section (Section 4.4, second
mechanism), we suggest that optimism bias can modulate attention
toward rewarding stimuli in a highly similar way. Positive rewarding
and negative threatening stimuli have been shown to recruit partly
overlapping neural networks (including the amygdala and the OFC; Li
et al., 2008; Murray, 2007; Pool et al., 2016a). Consequently, ex-
pectancies about signiﬁcant positive future events likely recruit at least
partly intersecting brain mechanisms and likewise generate a salience
map that guides attention toward rewarding stimuli.
In conclusion, the neuroscientiﬁc literature on optimism and at-
tention bias provides supportive evidence that both biases are closely
related. Brain areas underlying optimism bias and reward-related at-
tention bias overlap considerably. An interplay between the amygdala
and the human-reward system with cingulate areas such as the ACC and
PCC is proposed in both optimism (Aue et al., 2012; Sharot et al., 2007)
and attention bias (Field and Cox, 2002; Franken, 2003; Hickey et al.,
2010) and these areas can therefore represent critical underlying
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structures for bidirectional interactions between both biases. Yet, con-
crete empirical evidence on the neural mechanisms of causal links be-
tween optimism and attention bias is still needed. Such evidence will
greatly advance knowledge about the neurocognitive mechanisms un-
derlying optimism bias and therefore allows further investigation into
why the bias exists and how it is maintained. Moreover, it will advance
theories on cognitive bias interactions, such as the combined cognitive
biases hypothesis, and will generate new hypotheses about the speciﬁc
causal relations between optimism and attention bias by revealing the
involved brain areas and their functional and structural connectivity
(see Aue et al., 2009). Finally, research in the area has the potential to
contribute to the identiﬁcation of signiﬁcant neural vulnerability fac-
tors in psychopathology and to impact on current treatment strategies.
4.4. Possible mechanisms of neural communication linking optimism bias
and attention bias
Given that the ideas derived from fundamentally diﬀerent sources
(theoretical models outlined in Section 4.1, empirical studies outlined
in Section 4.2, and neuroscientiﬁc evidence outlined in Section 4.3)
converge, it is more than timely to address the potential interplay be-
tween optimism and reward-related attention bias. In what follows,
therefore, we outline three mechanisms of possible interaction between
these biases. All three mechanisms are based on the idea that antici-
pated reward (i.e., positive outcomes) functions as an incentive that
drives motivation. This hypothesis corresponds to the third core prin-
ciple of our framework, namely, that both optimism bias and attention
bias are characterized by similar underlying motivational processes
(i.e., striving for reward, as initiated by limbic structures; see Bateson,
2016; Small et al., 2005). Moreover, this similar underlying motivation
is proposed to be reﬂected in the shared neural activations of the two
biases. Through this motivation to strive for reward, speciﬁc expectancy
and attention systems are (re)directed to maximize reward consump-
tion (for an overview of brain areas involved, see Fig. 3).
Of note, all three proposed mechanisms imply that a minimum of
attention is always needed to identify stimuli: In order to ignore or
attend to individual pieces of information, it is necessary to know in
advance whether they contain positive or negative value. However, we
propose that the depth of processing of any given piece of evidence can
be substantially modiﬁed by varying the amount of attention it receives,
which inﬂuences optimism bias, on the one hand, and is inﬂuenced by
optimism bias on the other. For instance, attention processes that exert
a causal inﬂuence on optimism bias can be imagined in various situa-
tions. To illustrate, in Las Vegas, winning money can be perceived as a
rewarding positive outcome that (re)directs our ongoing attention to-
ward other people who just won money through gambling, conse-
quently making us more optimistic about being the next one to win.
Such a view is consistent with the ﬁrst mechanism within our frame-
work. At this point, it is important to note that the ﬁrst mechanism
(causal inﬂuences of attention bias on optimism bias) and the second
mechanism (causal inﬂuences of optimism bias on attention bias) are
not necessarily mutually exclusive; rather, based on the ﬁndings dis-
played in Sections 4.1–4.3, we suggest the existence of bidirectional
inﬂuences between optimism (expectancies) and attention bias.
First mechanism: causal inﬂuence of attention bias on optimism bias. In
accordance with Broadbent's ﬁlter model of attention (1958), we pos-
tulate that selectively attending to reward-related information (and
away from negative information) leads to optimism bias, in that se-
lective visual attention determines which part of the environmental
information is preferably processed. Wanting (striatum, amygdala)
drives ongoing visual attention to rewarding stimuli. This is in line with
Berridge and Robinson’s (1998) incentive salience theory, in which
mesolimbic and neostriatal dopamine functions to increase wanting of
speciﬁc rewards and thereby shapes the attention-capturing quality and
neural representation of reward-related stimuli. We propose that the
critical structures to shift attention are the PPC and the PCC, and se-
lective attention then impacts on how early visual input is processed
(e.g., reﬂected in the primary visual cortex; Desimone and Duncan,
1995; Padmala and Pessoa, 2011; the suggested ﬂow of information is
depicted in Fig. 3a). By allocating selective attention, desirable evi-
dence is processed preferably (striatum, amygdala), thus creating or
strengthening optimism regarding goal achievement (ACC, OFC, and
vmPFC).
Coming back to our Las Vegas example, wanting to win a lot of
money through gambling directs our ongoing visual attention pre-
ferably to smiling faces of people in the environment who just won a
game, while mostly ignoring those who lost and look sad, thus making
us more optimistic about winning money ourselves, for it seems to
happen to so many other people. In contrast to this example of healthy
processing, patients with depression do not show biased attention to
Fig. 3. Brain regions that have been most consistently involved in the processing of optimistic expectancies and positive attention bias. The proposed mechanisms of neural commu-
nication linking optimism bias and positive attention bias (see Section 4.4) are illustrated in separate parts of the ﬁgure. Note that the depicted arrows show functional, not anatomical,
connections. None of the mechanisms have been examined experimentally and are thus hypotheses of what underlying neural communication could look like. Diﬀerent mechanisms and
brain areas may be involved. The brain templates have been created with the sample MNI image, as provided in the Mango 4.0 Desktop Application for Windows (Research Imaging
Institute, The University of Texas Health Science Center at San Antonio; http://ric.uthscsa.edu/mango/). Colored arrows display the suggested direction of processing. a) First me-
chanism: Causal inﬂuence of attention bias on optimism bias.Wanting (striatum, amygdala) is suggested to drive ongoing visual attention to rewarding stimuli. The critical structures to shift
attention are the PPC and the PCC, and selective attention then aﬀects how early visual input is processed (reﬂected in the primary visual cortex). By allocating selective attention,
desirable evidence is processed preferably (striatum, amygdala), thus creating or strengthening optimism regarding goal achievement (ACC, OFC, and vmPFC). b) Second mechanism:
Causal inﬂuence of optimism bias on attention bias. Wanting (striatum, amygdala) can directly shape optimism bias in order to further increase goal-directed appetitive motivation and task
engagement; via top-down mechanisms (ACC, OFC, and vmPFC), optimism bias is then proposed to redirect currently ongoing visual attention (PCC, PPC, and visual cortex) toward
supportive environmental evidence (while largely ignoring negative evidence) in order to facilitate pursuing the goal to obtain the reward. c) Third mechanism: No causal inﬂuence
between optimism bias and attention bias. Wanting (striatum, amygdala) independently initiates supportive attentive (PPC, PCC, and visual cortex) and expectancy-related processes (ACC,
OFC, and vmPFC) with no interaction between the two.
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rewarding stimuli (but rather to negative stimuli; Gotlib et al., 2004)
and are simultaneously not characterized by an optimism bias (Garrett
et al., 2014; Korn et al., 2014; Strunk et al., 2006). In fact, we suggest
that biased attention to negative rather than positive stimuli among
patients with depression leads to more negative expectancies about the
future (in line with mechanisms involved in fear and anxiety described
by Aue and Okon-Singer, 2015), thereby maintaining a generally ne-
gative view. On a neural level, it is imaginable that connections be-
tween the amygdala and striatum associated with wanting, on the one
hand, and the PPC and PCC areas important for shifting attention, on
the other, are missing or dysfunctional and therefore prevent the for-
mation of an attention bias toward rewarding stimuli in patients with
depression. Alternatively (or additionally), one can speculate that an
interaction between reward-related biases in attention (PPC, PCC) and
expectancies (ACC, OFC, vmPFC) is not established because of dys-
functional activity of the amygdala and the striatum. Such a deviation
would also hinder the above proposed “normal” ﬂow of information.
Second mechanism: Causal inﬂuence of optimism bias on attention bias.
From the considerations outlined in the previous sections, we further
suggest that wanting (striatum, amygdala) can directly shape optimism
bias in order to further increase goal-directed appetitive motivation and
task engagement. In line with postulates derived from predictive coding
theory, we hypothesize that optimism bias, via top-down mechanisms
(ACC, OFC, and vmPFC), redirects currently ongoing visual attention
(PCC, PPC, and visual cortex) toward supportive environmental evi-
dence (while largely ignoring negative evidence) in order to facilitate
the pursuit of a goal to obtain a reward (see Fig. 3b). Re-entrant neural
processes in that sense have already been shown in the ﬁeld of per-
ception (Amaral and Price, 1984; Keil et al., 2009) and could apply to
the redirection of attention in a highly similar fashion.
In our example, wanting to win money through gambling makes us
highly optimistic about winning that money in the next game and
having the best hand of cards, which then redirects ongoing attention
toward supportive evidence, such as our friend smiling to encourage us.
In contrast to this process suggested to be shown by healthy individuals,
patients with depression or other psychopathologies do not display
optimism bias in the ﬁrst place (Garrett et al., 2014; Korn et al., 2014),
but have negative expectancies about the future (Strunk et al., 2006).
These expectancies can then lead to biased attention toward negative as
opposed to positive stimuli (Gotlib et al., 2004), thereby generally
maintaining negative cognitions. On a neural level, at least two dys-
functional scenarios are imaginable as being responsible for an absence
of healthy optimism-attention interactions in psychopathology. On the
one hand, malfunctioning connectivity of the amygdala and the
striatum with the ACC, OFC, and vmPFC could prevent wanting from
shaping optimism bias in the ﬁrst place. On the other hand, it is con-
ceivable that optimism bias does not exert top-down inﬂuences on at-
tention because connections of the ACC, OFC, and vmPFC with the PCC,
PPC, and visual cortex are dysfunctional.
Third mechanism: No causal inﬂuence between optimism bias and at-
tention bias. Although we consider it improbable, at the moment we
cannot rule out that wanting (striatum, amygdala) independently in-
itiates supportive attentive (PPC, PCC, and visual cortex) and ex-
pectancy-related processes (ACC, OFC, and vmPFC) with no interaction
between the two (Fig. 3c). In our example, this would mean that
wanting to win money in Las Vegas would (re)direct attention toward
other people winning money and shape expectancies toward optimism
about winning independently. However, research on the link between
attention and expectancies in threatening and in reward-related situa-
tions suggests that both processes are highly correlated in salient si-
tuations, with attention causally inﬂuencing expectancies or vice versa
(e.g., Aue et al., 2013b; Aue and Okon-Singer, 2015; Hahn and
Gronlund, 2007; Mohanty et al., 2009; Peters et al., 2015; Williams
et al., 2005). Therefore, we generally predict that the attention and
expectancy systems are coordinated and mutually reinforce each other.
In addition, although there is clear evidence that wanting aﬀects both
optimism and attention (Bastardi et al., 2011; Hickey et al., 2010;
Weinstein, 1980), there is no reason to suspect that the impact of at-
tention (optimistic expectancies) on optimistic expectancies (attention)
is mediated by changes in wanting.
In sum, all three proposed mechanisms are imaginable. An im-
portant consideration, as mentioned earlier, is that the ﬁrst and the
second mechanism are not necessarily mutually exclusive. In fact, we
anticipate that the ﬁrst two mechanisms combine. The concrete direc-
tion of inﬂuence between the biases can be context dependent. In both
cases, neural key activations would be expected in areas such as the
striatum, amygdala, ACC and PCC, and primary visual cortex. However,
from our review of the literature (Sections 2.2 and 3.2), we hypothesize
that causal inﬂuences of optimistic expectancies additionally recruit
more frontal areas, whereas causal attention inﬂuences rely on sup-
plementary parietal areas.
Investigating functional and structural connectivity between these
areas will yield important insights into the nature of the neural net-
works that underlie normal and pathological relations between reward-
related biases in expectancies and attention. Neuroscientiﬁc evidence
on such causal relations between attention and optimism bias has fur-
ther important implications for the treatment of psychopathology and
can help intervene in mutually enforcing negative bias patterns dis-
played by patients with psychological diseases (Aue and Okon-Singer,
2015; Everaert et al., 2016; Hirsch et al., 2006). Information about the
direction of inﬂuence between attention bias and optimism bias can, for
instance, give hints on which biases should be targeted as a priority in
psychotherapy (namely, those biases that can automatically alter other
clinically relevant biases) and on their speciﬁc role in the causation of
pathological symptoms. Moreover, knowledge about the speciﬁc neural
structures involved in optimism-attention bias interplay and their
functional connectivity can be decisive for the development of novel
psychopharmacological treatments (see Fossati, 2008).
In conclusion, with the present framework, we propose that biased
optimistic expectancies causally inﬂuence attention deployment, and
attention bias causally inﬂuences optimism. Through this mutually re-
enforcing interplay, reward-related biases are preserved in the long
term and a positive view of the environment and the future is main-
tained. This framework can be used to understand previous and future
neurocognitive work on optimism and attention bias because it will (a)
help to integrate research on single reward-related biases into a bigger
picture of interacting cognitive biases resulting from the overarching
motivation to pursue reward (i.e., motivation to reach a reward that
drives both biases in expectancies and attention); (b) make it easier to
interpret pivotal ﬁndings in research that focus on only one phenom-
enon (e.g., updating asymmetry in optimism bias), which often partly
represents eﬀects additionally arising from another, simultaneously
present, bias (e.g., attention bias; see Kress et al., submitted); (c) shed
light on the mechanisms related to the development and maintenance
of each bias (e.g., underlying attention processes contributing to biased
optimistic expectancies and vice versa); (d) help to uncover divergences
and commonalities in health and psychopathology (e.g., by testing how
evidence on interacting negative cognitive biases displayed in psycho-
pathology can be replicated in reward-related biases and whether
health and psychopathology result from diﬀerent or similar interactions
between cognitive biases); and (e) inspire new, personally adapted,
therapeutic interventions (e.g., by taking into account which speciﬁc
biases are shown by an individual and how their interplay aﬀects
particular symptoms of disease).
5. Potential roles of memory in the interplay of optimism bias and
attention bias
So far, we have argued that optimism and attention bias are linked.
However, according to the combined cognitive biases hypothesis (in-
troduced in Section 4.1), additional information processing biases (i.e.,
in memory or interpretation) can come into play. In particular, there is
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evidence that expectancy and memory processes are highly related to
each other (Aue and Okon-Singer, 2015) and that many optimistic ex-
pectancies we have as humans are based on our prior experiences
(Metcalfe, 1998). At the same time, memory and attention processes are
highly interactive processes, as evidenced by a large body of behavioral
and neuroscientiﬁc research (Chun and Turk-Browne, 2007). It is for
this reason that we now point out how memory processes have been
observed to interact with optimism bias on the one hand and attention
bias on the other. We then suggest how memory processes can inﬂuence
the interplay of optimism and attention bias, one possibility being that
memory functions as a mediator in the optimism bias–attention bias
associations we put forth earlier. Evidence about such threefold inter-
actions can reveal even more reﬁned mechanisms underlying the ben-
eﬁts of reward-related biases and explain how a positive outlook is
ultimately maintained in healthy individuals.
Concerning the relation between optimism and memory bias, it has
been suggested that optimism bias is the result of memory-based pro-
cessing heuristics. If – as proposed – people use all information at hand
(e.g., evoked from memory) to build expectancies, optimism bias
simply arises because the information at hand is not always correct and
complete (Metcalfe, 1998). As a consequence, unreasonably positive
memories can lead to biased expectancies in the form of optimism bias.
Accordingly, in a meta-analysis on time estimations of future events,
Roy et al. (2005) indeed found strong support for a positive association
between biased memories and expectancies. Some famous examples of
overoptimistic time expectancies have been observed in the time esti-
mations for the construction of various important buildings, such as the
Sydney Opera House or the Channel Tunnel between England and
France. Speciﬁcally, the authors state that people base their predictions
of future task duration on their memories of how long past events have
taken, but these memories systematically underestimate the true
duration. Although these links between memory and optimistic ex-
pectancies primarily concern temporal aspects, one also wants to con-
sider the valence aspect. For instance, people who better remember
positive events in their life than others do are likely prone to see their
future more optimistically. Empirical evidence for such a mechanism
will have wide-reaching implications for the treatment of psycho-
pathology, as it implies the need to correct the absence of positive
memory biases (e.g., through cognitive restructuring; Liang et al., 2011;
Rinck and Becker, 2005; Watkins et al., 1996) to make patients see their
future more optimistically.
In a similar vein, it has been suggested that attention processes are
strongly related to memory processes (Chun and Turk-Browne, 2007).
Numerous investigations have demonstrated that the current focus of
attention determines which information is encoded in memory (e.g.,
Everaert et al., 2014; Fougnie, 2008) and that attention during memory
retrieval predicts subsequent memory bias of positive information
(Everaert and Koster, 2015). Therefore, preferably attending to positive
stimuli in one’s environment is likely closely related to the pre-
dominance of positive information in memory (see Tran et al., 2011, for
similar reﬂections on the relation between interpretation bias and
memory bias).
In addition to these inﬂuences of attention on memory, the opposite
direction of inﬂuence has also been proposed, namely, that past ex-
perience reﬂected in multiple memory systems guides attention (Chun
and Turk-Browne, 2007). Evidence for this memory-guided attention
allocation has been shown for implicit long-term memory experience
(Johnson et al., 2007; Summerﬁeld et al., 2006b). In conclusion,
memory and attention interact in both directions: First, memory has a
limited capacity and therefore depends on selective attention processes
that determine which pieces of information will be encoded. Second,
memory about past experiences guides attention in order to secure
optimal selection (Chun and Turk-Browne, 2007). Of note, the existence
of bidirectional inﬂuences between memory and attention has im-
portant implications not just for the clinical context, because these in-
ﬂuences contribute to the development and maintenance of
psychological diseases (Everaert et al., 2014). Such interactions may be
equally momentous for healthy processing by ensuring positive mood
and well-being.
Even though there is evidence for both optimism-memory and at-
tention-memory interactions, to our knowledge no studies have yet
empirically examined the threefold relationship between optimism
bias, attention bias, and memory bias. However, one can speculate that
a threefold link exists (for similar reﬂections in the negative domain,
see Aue and Okon-Singer, 2015). On the one hand, a positivity bias in
memory has been suggested to initiate shifts in attention (e.g.,
Hutchinson and Turk-Browne, 2012) toward positive stimuli in the
environment, which can then lead to biased optimistic expectancies
about future events. On the other hand, it is also imaginable that biased
memories directly shape optimistic expectancies about the future
(Metcalfe, 1998; Roy et al., 2005), which then result in biased attention
toward the internal and external environment (Kress et al., submitted;
Peters et al., 2015). In applying this to aﬀective disorders, one can
assume that if depressed patients do not show a positivity bias in
memory (Watkins et al., 1996), they also form less optimistic ex-
pectancies about their future. The latter is characteristic for patients
with depression (Garrett et al., 2014; Korn et al., 2014) and has been
suggested to bias attention less toward rewarding stimuli and more
toward negative stimuli in the environment (Beck, 1976; Bradley et al.,
1997; Koster et al., 2005; Leyman et al., 2007).
In line with mutual inﬂuences among the three biases, it is also
conceivable that memory processes mediate the link between ex-
pectancies and attention. For instance, the current focus of attention
determines which information is encoded in memory (Craik and Rose,
2012; Fougnie, 2008). Biased attention toward reward-related stimuli
can, therefore, lead to a positivity bias in memory. Subsequently, ex-
pectancies about the future are too optimistic, as future expectancies
derive at least partly from biased past experience (Metcalfe, 1998; Roy
et al., 2005). Furthermore, memory bias can also mediate how ex-
pectancies inﬂuence attention. In this scenario, biased expectancies
activate corresponding working memory content in the form of an a
priori map or a mental template. This template then drives attention
toward rewarding stimuli in a top-down manner (Kress et al., sub-
mitted; for related ideas in the negative domain and corresponding
studies, see Aue et al., 2016, 2013a). Empirical evidence for such
mediating mechanisms of memory content regarding the link between
attention and optimism can explain further details about multifaceted
cognitive bias interactions and contribute to a more nuanced view on
how exactly these interactions are related to emotion regulation and
mental health.
Further information regarding the determining mechanisms in these
bias interactions can be gained from studying the neural correlates of
the diﬀerent biases. Critical brain structures underlying emotional
memories usually consist of the amygdala (Morris et al., 1998), the
insula (Hamann, 2001), and the septo-hippocampal system
(McNaughton and Corr, 2004), as well as prefrontal cortex regions such
as the vmPFC (Dolcos et al., 2012; Phelps et al., 2004). The amygdala,
the ACC – an area often coactivated with the insula (Menon and Uddin,
2010) – and the prefrontal cortex areas have also been involved in
optimism bias (Sharot et al., 2011, 2007) and attention bias (Mohanty
et al., 2008; Naghavi and Nyberg, 2005). This points to similar neural
networks at the basis of the diﬀerent cognitive biases and therefore
further supports the idea of intimately intertwined processes. Conse-
quently, studying the neurophysiological nature of a link between all
three biases is of high interest.
One promising approach for uncovering the neurophysiological
nature of multiple bias interactions has been provided by Soto et al.
(2008). They suggest that neurons in the prefrontal and more posterior
brain regions are active when certain stimuli are held in working
memory. Such neural activation has been proposed to drive attention in
a top-down manner. According to these authors, “the sustained en-
hancement of cells tuned to particular features might provide the neural
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correlate of expectancies that inﬂuence subsequent selection, leading to
enhanced responding when the item in memory is represented in a
search display” (p. 346). This is one possible neural mechanism that
explains the threefold link between biased expectancies, memory, and
attention. However, Soto et al. (2008) do not explicitly refer to opti-
mism bias, which is why further research is still needed. Together, the
theoretical considerations outlined in this section strongly call for an
integrated view of overlapping processes related to memory, attention,
and expectancies. Revealing the underlying neural mechanisms of op-
timism-attention-memory interplay can stimulate hypotheses for future
neurocognitive research (e.g., regarding functional and structural con-
nectivity among speciﬁc brain areas) and has the potential to improve
current psychopharmacological treatment options (Fossati, 2008).
6. Concluding remarks and future directions
Optimism bias represents a – usually – highly beneﬁcial cognitive
phenomenon that not only is associated with mental and physical
health (Hevey et al., 2014; Garrett et al., 2014; Korn et al., 2014) but
that also has a high impact on our society. However, in order to identify
the mechanisms underlying optimism bias, it is important for other
cognitive biases and their neural correlates to be taken into account.
Studying diﬀerent cognitive biases in an integrated approach helps us
understand causalities and connections that are still unclear and
thereby contributes to a more advanced view of each bias, improves
theoretical models, and provides help for clinical practice. One pro-
mising approach is to investigate the link between optimism and at-
tention bias. The outlined framework of bidirectional interplay between
optimism and attention bias can be used to (a) understand prior and
future research, (b) guide future work in the ﬁeld by emphasizing
methodological advice for and speciﬁc hypotheses to be tested in future
empirical research, and (c) outline a number of open questions that
might lead to further reﬁnement of the current framework.
Regarding improved understanding of prior and future research, our
theoretical framework implies that isolated studies that examine cog-
nitive biases, especially optimism bias and attention bias, should be
evaluated with caution. Attention processes can be present but not
detected in studies on optimism and vice versa. For instance, taking
attention bias into account can extend, alter, or explain past ﬁndings on
optimism bias (e.g., updating asymmetry in optimism bias being shown
because of biased attention processes; see Kress et al., submitted).
Moreover, the current framework calls for caution in interpreting
neuroscientiﬁc ﬁndings on optimism and attention bias in isolation. We
have shown that neural correlates of optimism and attention bias
widely overlap and can therefore be attributed to either of the two
biases or their interplay. This aspect is thus evidently of great im-
portance for the interpretation of existing data in terms of speciﬁc study
questions.
In order to distinguish biased expectancy and attention processes
and to ensure that reliable conclusions can be drawn from studies on
interacting cognitive biases, the current framework calls for funda-
mental methodological changes to guide future research in the ﬁeld. To
date, correlational methods are often used to examine associations
between optimism and attention bias. However, additional considera-
tion of causality is imperative in order to identify the cognitive pro-
cesses underlying optimism bias and should thus be emphasized. Causal
relations can be examined by manipulating one of the biases and
measuring its eﬀect on the other, just as was done in the study of Peters
et al. (2015). Such causal inﬂuences should be investigated in both
possible directions (i.e., optimism bias on attention bias and attention
bias on optimism bias). The ﬁrst evidence from our laboratory suggests
that manipulated optimistic and pessimistic expectancies alter attention
to rewarding and punishing stimuli. More important, optimistic ex-
pectancies repeatedly had a stronger eﬀect on attention deployment
than pessimistic expectancies did, thereby emphasizing the powerful
eﬀects of optimism on other types of information processing (Kress
et al., submitted). Whether causal inﬂuences of attention on optimism
bias, as suggested by our framework, exist in a similar manner is yet to
be investigated in empirical studies.
By additionally proposing a network of brain areas serving as the
underlying neural correlate of cognitive bias interplay, our framework
helps generate speciﬁc hypotheses to be tested in future empirical re-
search. The suggested network includes the amygdala, which generates
emotions, on the one hand, and the fronto-parietal and cingulate cor-
tices, which are involved in emotion regulation and attentional control,
on the other. Diﬀerent mechanisms regarding the relationship between
optimism and attention bias are conceivable, but there are most likely
bidirectional inﬂuences. For instance, wanting can lead visual attention
to rewarding stimuli driven by the PPC and PCC and can strengthen
optimism regarding goal achievement. We also postulate that wanting
can directly shape optimism bias, which then exerts top-down inﬂu-
ences (ACC, OFC, and vmPFC) on visual attention and activity in the
visual cortex.
Both of these mechanisms of neural communication are driven by
goal-directed behavior toward reward (Bateson, 2016; Small et al.,
2005), a central underlying motivational factor for optimism and at-
tention bias that we emphasize in our framework. It is for this reason
that we have speciﬁcally focused on reward-related attention processes.
In this regard, the dominant role of neurotransmitters, especially do-
pamine, in reward processing (Berridge and Robinson, 1998) has to be
investigated because this has been shown to have important implica-
tions in both optimism and attention bias (Field and Cox, 2008;
Franken, 2003; Sharot et al., 2012a) and could reveal crucial in-
formation about the neural mechanisms underlying their interplay
(e.g., concerning the question of whether administration of L-DOPA
enhances not only optimism bias, but also its interplay with attention
bias; Sharot et al., 2012a). Moreover, even though we propose a pivotal
role for reward as a motivational factor in our framework, future the-
oretical and empirical investigation should determine whether opti-
mism-attention interplay extends to non-reward-related forms of posi-
tive attention bias, such as biased attention to stimuli, which have a
positive value but no direct relevance for the observer (e.g., pictures
displaying sport scenes; Pool et al., 2016a; see Armstrong and Olatunji,
2012; Peckham et al., 2010, for meta-analyses on this broader view of
positive attention bias).
The proposed framework can still be extended in diﬀerent direc-
tions. Therefore, we discuss a number of open questions to be answered
by future theoretical and empirical work in the remainder of this sec-
tion. According to a recent taxonomy by Chun et al. (2011), attention
processes can be classiﬁed as internal or external (internal attention
refers to internal cognitive representations, whereas external attention
refers to the external, perceptual world). Within these two areas, one
can further distinguish between selection, modulation, and vigilance.
Because of limited processing capacity, people need to select which
information they attend to from numerous competing stimuli. After a
piece of information is selected from these competing options, attention
modulation refers to how this selected piece is processed (inﬂuencing
subsequent behavior and memory). Whereas modulation refers to the
current, immediate eﬀects on attention processing, vigilance refers to
the ability to sustain attention over time (Chun et al., 2011). Future
research on the interplay of optimism and attention bias should take
these diﬀerent processes into account to shed further light on the
question of whether particular attention processes are diﬀerently in-
ﬂuenced by, or can diﬀerently inﬂuence, optimism bias. It will be an
important beneﬁt to the literature if prospective empirical research in
the ﬁeld of interacting cognitive biases distinguishes between the dif-
ferent aspects of attention represented in selection, modulation, and
vigilance.
In a similar vein, the proposed framework may need to be adapted
to speciﬁc forms of optimism bias (e.g., unrealistic optimism, wishful
thinking; see Section 2) that, in the present article – because of limited
numbers of studies in any area – were pooled together under the broad
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term optimism bias. Findings on the interplay between optimism bias
and attention and memory processes could diﬀer if one diﬀerentiates
between subconcepts of optimism bias instead of working with a pos-
sibly multifaceted concept, as we did in the current framework.
Likewise, it will be interesting to further study whether a possible
link between attention, expectancy, and memory biases applies equally
to optimism and pessimism. It is assumed that, because of its adaptive
and beneﬁcial use in human life, optimism bias is a unique cognitive
bias (support for this is provided by Kress et al., submitted). Thus, the
processes underlying pessimism can indeed be diﬀerent. However, one
problem in examining pessimism is that it is often deﬁned as the op-
posite of optimism. It can sometimes even be assessed on the same
scales as optimism, which then automatically leads to the detection of
comparable mechanisms (Mehrabian and Ljunggren, 1997; Scheier
et al., 1994). Similarly, to distinguish between optimism and pessi-
mism, future research needs to determine whether valence-speciﬁc
biases in attention and memory have a diﬀerential impact on other
cognitive biases (e.g., whether reward-related and punishment-related
biases in attention and memory diﬀerently inﬂuence or are inﬂuenced
by expectancies).
In addition, as we have emphasized, the role of memory processes in
possibly inﬂuencing attention and optimism bias, or their association,
needs to be examined in greater detail. This is because forming biased
expectancies about the future has been suggested to be based on biased
memories, which also appear to be related to biased attention (see
Section 5 for additionally proposed causal inﬂuences between the three
biases). Moreover, interpretation bias is another phenomenon that is
possibly linked to the cognitive biases mentioned earlier, which calls for
the need to extend our framework to include even more cognitive
biases. For example, it has been shown that imagery of positive events
could lead to a positive interpretation bias (Holmes et al., 2009; Pictet
et al., 2011; Torkan et al., 2014) and that interpretation bias mod-
iﬁcation training aﬀects memory (Tran et al., 2011). However, inter-
pretation biases toward positive information in general and their neural
correlates have been examined to a much lesser extent than have
memory biases; hence, this is the reason that we focused on optimism,
attention, and memory.
Furthermore, when investigating the threefold relationship between
optimism, attention, and memory bias, one also has to be aware that on
the one hand, diﬀerent changes in one bias might lead to the same
outcome in another bias (equiﬁnality), and on the other, the same
change in one bias in diﬀerent contexts might lead to diﬀerent out-
comes in another bias (multiﬁnality). These concepts of equiﬁnality and
multiﬁnality are commonly used in developmental research (Cichetti
and Rogosch, 1996) and can well apply to research on multidirectional
inﬂuences between cognitive biases. For instance, it is conceivable that
various forms of reward-related biases in attention (e.g., during selec-
tion, modulation, and vigilance; Chun et al., 2011) and memory (e.g.,
during encoding and retrieval; Everaert et al., 2014; Everaert and
Koster, 2015; Fougnie, 2008) can result in optimism bias. At the same
time, the same single form of reward-related bias in attention and
memory displayed at diﬀerent moments in time or in diﬀerent contexts
does not necessarily result in a comparable optimism bias. Whether the
concept of equiﬁnality and multiﬁnality really applies to cognitive bias
interplay and which speciﬁc (neural) circumstances might lead to
equiﬁnal and multiﬁnal outcomes in the relation between attention,
memory, and optimism bias could be the topic of intriguing questions in
future neurocognitive research and theoretical considerations.
Finally, diﬀerentially salient situations and stimuli have been sug-
gested to correspond with diﬀerences in cognitive processing (Corbetta
and Shulman, 2002; Menon and Uddin, 2010). Investigations should
therefore be made into how a possible link between attention and op-
timism diﬀers when highly salient stimuli are used compared with low
salient stimuli. This is particularly interesting for an application in the
clinical context. Stimuli that are relevant for biased expectancies and
attention in clinical settings (e.g., cigarettes or drugs) are often highly
salient for the person concerned, whereas stimuli frequently used in
attention tasks in nonclinical settings (e.g., colored letters or graphical
objects) are of comparatively low personal saliency even if they are
associated with small monetary incentives. However, how stimulus
saliency aﬀects the link between attention and optimism is also relevant
in everyday life. For instance, companies should use highly salient sti-
muli when advertising their products to increase people’s attention,
hence making potential customers more optimistic about the beneﬁts of
their products.
In summary, positivity biases in the past, present, and future – i.e.
memories, attention, and expectancies – share speciﬁc characteristics.
They are important for goal-directed behavior and related to well-being
and health. It is therefore reasonable to suggest that these biases are
intimately intertwined and interact or mutually inﬂuence each other.
Notably, because the simultaneous consideration of diﬀerent biases has
very much advanced research, insights, and therapeutic interventions
in the negative domain (e.g., regarding anxiety disorders), a combined
cognitive biases approach cannot be ignored by researchers when ex-
amining optimism bias. Determining exactly how reward-related cog-
nitive biases interact will have a large impact on theoretical con-
siderations as well as on practical applications. For instance, solving the
question of whether the relation between these biases has a speciﬁc
direction or acts bidirectionally will reveal important mechanisms for
the prevention of psychopathology. Moreover, a more profound un-
derstanding of the interactive nature of cognitive biases and their
neural determinants not only will help explain how psychological dis-
orders such as depression, addiction, and mania are developed and
maintained, but will also reveal possible mechanisms to be targeted in
psychotherapy.
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